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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 19/04/2006 Accident number: 60 
Accident time: 11:25 Accident Date: 25/02/1997 
Where it occurred: Bela Vista, Bie 
Province 
Country: Angola 
Primary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Missed-mine accident Date of main report: 03/03/1997 
ID original source: HM/GP/MP - H242 Name of source: INAROEE 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: PPM-2 AP blast Ground condition: pylons and surrounds 
Date record created: 23/01/2004 Date  last modified: 23/01/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: Chinguar Map series:  
Map edition: Folha 257 Map sheet:  
Map name: 1:100 000  
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate equipment (?) 
inadequate medical provision (?) 
handtool may have increased injury (?) 
inadequate area marking (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
safety distances ignored (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
 
Accident report 
The demining group used a two-man team and a one-man drill at the site. In this the same 
deminer cuts undergrowth, excavates and uses the detector. 
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An investigation, dated 3rd March 1997, was made by the country MAC and its report was 
found on file. The following summarises its content.  
The report stated that the demining task was a series of pylons and a bridge. Teams of two 
deminers per pylon were clearing a 10 metre square area around the base. When the board 
of inquiry visited the site on 1st March, demining was in progress around other pylons and 
they ordered it to stop immediately. The inquiry criticised the fact that the site had been tidied 
before their arrival. The were told that the victim had located two mines that day prior to the 
accident. These were destroyed and the victim was checking the blast area with his detector 
when he got another reading. The reading was in front of a partly exposed mine. The victim 
seemed to be "concerned with the (exposed) mine". He was wearing his protective equipment 
"correctly" but started to excavate the partly exposed mine without prodding the new reading 
first. At 11:25 the hidden mine detonated. The victim was "less than 50cm" from the 
detonation. 
Fragments were found in the deminer's vest but none had penetrated. The blast injuries to the 
face did not include fragments, which the team thought implied that the visor had given some 
protection. [A photo of the visor is included, severely distorted and sooted - with the damage 
apparently on the inside.] 
At 13:05 the victim arrived at a field hospital and at Luanda Hospital at 18:00. The country 
MAC amended the demining group's plan to take the deminer to a private hospital, which may 
have contributed to the delay and was criticised by the investigators. 
 
Conclusion 
The investigating team decided that the deminer's negligence, failures of supervision and the 
"unorthodox method of clearance at the site" all contributed to the accident. It was further 
stated that "insufficient detail" in the SOPs was a factor. The unorthodox methods used at the 
site included using unpainted and irregularly spaced sticks that were not in a straight line and 
marking a detector reading with grass. The demining group's published methods were not 
used. Just before the accident the supervisor destroyed two mines in the victim's lane. These 
were spaced so that the deminer went past one to detect the other. This was deemed 
"inherently unsafe" by the investigators. Another deminer was working only 5m from the 
victim, which they also observed was unsafe.  
 
Recommendations 
The inquiry recommended that training be modified and SOPs amended. They said that the 
victim's team should be retrained, concentrating on marking procedures and the use of a front 
of lane marker. The supervisors should "re-familiarise themselves with the SOP". They 
decreed that clearance must be suspended until the re-training was completed and required 
the demining group to revise their SOPs. They also recommended that the Angola MAC 
expedite the standardisation of Angolan Operating Procedures and assess the other demining 
sites controlled by this group.  
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 82 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: DECEASED 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: 6 hours 35 minutes 
Protection issued: Long visor 
Short frontal vest 
Protection used: Short frontal vest 
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No medical report was made available. The victim died three days after the accident. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Management/control inadequacy" because 
the demining group's SOPs were not followed by the field supervisors. Their inadequate field 
management (including an expatriate "expert") appears to illustrate a failing of management 
at country level within the demining group. The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate 
training”. 
The victim's injuries were unusually severe. Although the unacceptable time-lapse between 
the accident and treatment may have contributed to the fatality, these records include several 
where deminers have initiated blast mines more than twice the size of this one without 
adequate facial protection and have not died.  
It seems likely that the victim was working with his visor raised and leaning forward over the 
top of the mine that detonated. The injuries are not detailed, but throat and neck injuries seem 
most likely. It is likely that the victim's handtool (or parts of it) struck the victim's neck, causing 
the severe injuries (see Related papers). 
 
Related papers 
The demining group produced an internal investigation report which was made available. This 
report indicated that a second mine detonated "sympathetically" when the first initiated. The 
second mine was 40cm away. The report stated that the victim's "visor was destroyed, 
probably by the impact of his trowel", noting that the visor did not protect him from the blast. 
The report acknowledged that a "standard pattern" of clearance for confined areas would 
"help avoid the practice of mine-hunting".  
A letter from the Angola MAC to the demining group (dated simply March 1997) pointed out 
that in the accident reports of 3rd March 1997, 19th November 1996 and 3rd July 1996 "the 
same points were raised" with regard to inadequate supervision. That letter demanded that 
the Angolan Supervisor and the senior expatriate Supervisor in charge when this accident 
occurred "should not be permitted to continue working in demining operations in Angola".  
A letter from the demining group to the Angola MAC confirmed that retraining was under way 
and invited observation. It also stated that the supervisor would only be used as an interpreter 
in future. The fate of the expatriate senior supervisor was not mentioned. 
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